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Abstract
Background: Bradykinesia is a cardinal feature of Parkinson’s disease (PD). Despite its disabling impact, the precise cause of
this symptom remains elusive. Recent thinking suggests that bradykinesia may be more than simply a manifestation of
motor slowness, and may in part reflect a specific deficit in the operation of motivational vigour in the striatum. In this paper
we test the hypothesis that movement time in PD can be modulated by the specific nature of the motivational salience of
possible action-outcomes.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We developed a novel movement time paradigm involving winnable rewards and
avoidable painful electrical stimuli. The faster the subjects performed an action the more likely they were to win money (in
appetitive blocks) or to avoid a painful shock (in aversive blocks). We compared PD patients when OFF dopaminergic
medication with controls. Our key finding is that PD patients OFF dopaminergic medication move faster to avoid aversive
outcomes (painful electric shocks) than to reap rewarding outcomes (winning money) and, unlike controls, do not speed up
in the current trial having failed to win money in the previous one. We also demonstrate that sensitivity to distracting
stimuli is valence specific.
Conclusions/Significance: We suggest this pattern of results can be explained in terms of low dopamine levels in the
Parkinsonian state leading to an insensitivity to appetitive outcomes, and thus an inability to modulate movement speed in
the face of rewards. By comparison, sensitivity to aversive stimuli is relatively spared. Our findings point to a rarely described
property of bradykinesia in PD, namely its selective regulation by everyday outcomes.
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Introduction
Bradykinesia is a cardinal feature of Parkinson’s disease (PD) [1]
however its precise cause remains the subject of debate, with
several hypotheses being put forward [2–5]. A principal conjecture
is that bradykinesia may be a compensatory response whereby
patients slow down in order to improve movement accuracy [2,3].
This explanation, however, cannot provide a complete picture, as
bradykinesia still persists when the spatial accuracy constraints of
the task are removed [4,6]. Another hypothesis proposes that
bradykinesia may be due to a deficit in force production [5] this
too has contested by studies which have demonstrated that PD are
able to achieve adequate muscle contractions on neurophysiolog-
ical testing [7]. Recent empirical findings and theoretical accounts
suggest that bradykinesia, rather than being simply a manifestation
of motor slowness (movement speed and initiation), might reflect a
specific deficit in the operation of motivational vigour in the
striatum. For example, compared with controls, PD patients could
achieve similar speeds and accuracy of reaching movements, but
did so more rarely, putatively demonstrating an implicit ‘reluc-
tance’ to move fast [8].
A speeding effect of dopamine on action in response to rewards
has been widely described [9–11]. However, the effect of
dopamine depletion on punishment avoidance is much less well
understood and has not been formally tested in humans. One of
the striking clinical characteristics of bradykinesia in PD is its
variability [6,12], with the same patient being able to achieve very
different movement speeds in different contexts. An extreme
manifestation of this variability is ‘‘kinesia paradoxica’’ where patients
are suddenly able to move at near normal speeds, which usually
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occurs only in extreme aversive contexts [13,14]. This class of
observation motivated us to examine if winnable rewards and
avoidable punishments might have differential effects on move-
ment time.
Our use of rewards and punishments furnished us with an
opportunity to test whether there is an effect of dopamine
depletion, as manifest in the Parkinsonian state, on an ability to
maintain a response plan or working memory trace in the face of
distraction and whether this is valence specific. This in principle
could explain some of the conflicting findings in the literature: PD
patients are impaired when required to ‘multitask’ motor and
cognitive tasks [15–17], although when working memory is
explicitly tested, dopamine depletion reduces distractibility
[18,19]. However in these tasks, outcome valence was not
explicitly manipulated, leaving unresolved the question of whether
an impact of distraction may be context (valence) sensitive.
We developed a novel movement time paradigm involving
winnable rewards and avoidable electric shocks, and tested PD
patients and matched controls. Critically, we assessed movement
time and not reaction times. The motivation here was to remove
any confound of cueing, given the known sensitivity of PD patients
to visual and auditory cues [20,21]. Additionally, we were
specifically interested in measuring the time it takes to execute as
opposed to initiate a movement, thereby focusing on an important
component of bradykinesia. In our paradigm, the faster the
subjects performed an action the more likely they were to win
money (in appetitive blocks) or to avoid an electric shock (in
aversive blocks). We compared patients when OFF dopaminergic
medication with controls. This means we tested patients in a more
natural disease state, minimising as far as possible the effect of
medication fluctuations and dose variations.
Methods
Participants
Twenty three adults (12 PD patients and 11 control subjects)
participated, with procedures approved by the Moorfields &
Whittington Research Ethics committee. Patients were recruited
from the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery
(NHNN) and control subjects either through advertisements or in
some instances were spouses of patients. Written informed consent
was obtained from all subjects and transport costs were
reimbursed. Participants were paid an extra fee of between £5
and £15 dependent on task performance.
Patients with PD
Twelve English speaking early- to moderate-stage [H+Y stage-
mean (SE) 2.4 (0.14)] [22] idiopathic PD patients (eight males) (as
per UK Brain bank criteria) [age: 48–82 years; mean (SE) 66.6
(2.6) years, 11 right-handed] completed the study. They had on
average (SE) 13.25 (0.66) years of education. Initial diagnosis of
PD ranged from 3 to 9 years [mean (SE) 5.45 (0.7) years]. There
was no history of other major neurological or psychiatric disease.
Patients were on various regimens of anti-Parkinsonian medica-
tions; carbidopa/levodopa combinations (n = 11); dopamine
receptor agonists alone (n = 1). Total daily dose of carbidopa/
levodopa varied from 75/300 mg to 250/1000 mg [mean (SE)
117/468 (19.6/78.7) mg].
Control Group
Eleven English-speaking controls (six males) [age: 38–73 years;
mean (SE) 61.72 (3.1) years, 9 right-handed], in good health with
no history of neurological or major psychiatric illness completed
the study. They had on average (SE) 14.2 (0.8) years of education.
Current medications included anti-hypertensives (n = 4), lipid-
regulating drugs (n = 3), antidepressants (n = 1), aspirin (n = 1).
Both groups completed the computerised movement time task
detailed below. A subsequent neuropsychological test battery was
administered, comprising: (i) Mini Mental State Examination to
assess cognitive impairment [23]; (ii) Beck Depression Inventory
[24]; and (iii) Impulse control disorder questionnaire (adapted
from [25]. Severity of clinical symptoms was assessed in the PD
group according to the Hoehn and Yahr [22] five-point rating
scale, and the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS –
all sections) [26]. PD patients completed one test session in the
relative ‘OFF’ medication state, following a minimum of 12 hours
withdrawal from all dopaminergic medication and omission of
slow-release preparations for a minimum of 18 hours. Controls
also completed one test session. Average ratings were Hoehn and
Yahr 2.4 mean (SE) 2.4 (0.14); UPDRS 48.5 mean (SE) 48.5 (3.6).
PD patients and controls were well matched for age
(F(1,21) = 1.44, p = 0.242 ), education (years) (F(1,21) = 0.87,
p = 0.361) and MMSE (F(1,21) = 0.48, p = 0.495). PD patients
had higher BDI and ICD scores however when compared to
controls the differences only reached trend level significance (BDI
(F(1,21) = 3.39, p= 0.08 and ICD (F(1,21) = 3.05, p = 0.095)
(table 1)).
Movement Time Task
Stimulus presentation and response recordings were conducted
using Cogent software (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk), programmed in
Matlab (Natwick, MA). The task was designed to measure
movement times in response to stimuli associated with rewarding
or punishing outcomes. There were two types of trials: trials in
which participants’ aim was to win money and trials in which the
aim was to avoid shocks. There is no exact way to equate the
magnitude of painful shocks with money, but our choice of 10
pence and 1 shock was based on our previous evidence using the
same equipment (albeit with a slightly more intense shock) in an
(‘implicit’) instrumental performance context [27]. The task
consisted of 6 interleaved blocks of 50 trials, blocks of ‘money’
trials alternated with blocks of ‘shock’ trials. The first block type
was randomised between subjects.
Trials began with presentation of either a money or shock
symbol for 2 seconds. Symbols were presented on a blue or yellow
background, corresponding to trials in which subjects could win
money or trials where they should avoid shocks. This indicator of
context was to remind participants of the current trial type.
Background colours were counterbalanced across subjects. Partic-
ipants were instructed to refrain from any action while the symbol
remained on the screen. When the symbol disappeared, they were
required to press a key on the keyboard to start the trial. Trials
were self-paced and only started when the first key was pressed.
Table 1. Neuropsychological data sets.
Patients (n =12) Controls (n =11)
Age 66.6 (2.6) 61.7 (3.1)
Education (years) 13.2 (0.6) 14.2 (0.8)
MMSE 28.5 (0.3) 28.9 (0.4)
BDI 10.2 (1.5) 6.1 (1.5)
ICD 2.25 (0.7) 0.63 (0.54)
Values represent mean (SE). BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; MMSE =Mini
Mental State Examination; ICD = impulse control disorder questionnaire.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047138.t001
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We opted for this design specifically to prevent the start of the trial
being explicitly cued, in light of known effects of cueing in PD
[20,21]. After commencing a trial, by pressing the first key,
subjects then needed to press an adjacent key on the keyboard
(approximately 1 cm away), using the same finger, in as quick a
time as possible. On half of the trials (both in the money and shock
trials), after the first key was pressed, an attentional distractor
appeared mid screen, which subjects were instructed to ignore.
This remained on the screen until the trial was terminated by the
second button press (see Figure 1 for task depiction).
We defined the time between the first and second button press
as the movement time. Following the second button press (i.e.
completion of the trial), a screen was shown indicating trial
outcome. In ’money’ blocks, participants either did or did not
win 10 p. In ‘shock’ blocks, participants either avoided or
received a shock. Outcome delivery depended probabilistically
on the reaction time, such that the probability of receiving a
reward (or avoiding a shock) was varied inversely with the
reaction time. However the constant of proportionality varied
slowly over the course of the experiment to induce additional
variability, so that at times a fast reaction was very likely to result
in successful reward or avoidance, and at other times less likely.
This was done to ensure that subjects remained engaged with the
task and did not ’habituate’ the task parameters. Specifically, the
function used was p (reward or avoidance) = 12(c(t) * RT(t) ),
where c(t) is a slowly changing Gaussian random walk over trials
t and bounded between 0.2 and 1, and RT(t) is the reaction time
on trial t.
Subjects first performed a short practice session in order to
familiarise themselves with the task during which they neither
received shocks nor won money.
Participants were seated in a well-lit room in front of a desktop
computer with a normal keyboard. Two Digitimer boxes were
fitted with circular electrodes. Triggers for the shock box were sent
via the parallel port to the input on the shock box. Before
commencing the task, participants had an electrode attached to
the back of their non-dominant hand and underwent a shock
titration procedure. This consisted of first establishing a maximal
threshold level at which the electrical current was rated as very
uncomfortable. Then, an automated staircase procedure was used
Figure 1. Schematic of the movement time task. Trial types are illustrated as a function of outcome valence (yellow for money trials and blue
for shock trials) and presence or absence of a distractor (green flashing square). There were two possible outcomes in the money trials; ‘you have won
10 p’ or ‘you have not won 10 p’ and there were two possible outcomes for the shock trials; ‘you will now receive a shock’ or ‘you will now not
receive a shock’. Subjects were exposed to 4 distinct trial types (see methods for details) comprising (i) money trial without distractor, (ii) money trial
with distractor, (iii) shock trial without distractor, (iv) shock trial with distractor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047138.g001
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to determine the level of shock for each individual that was 60% of
their own maximal threshold.
Failure to complete a trial correctly, for example by pressing the
same button twice in error, resulted in no outcome being delivered
(i.e. no money or shock outcomes). Overall, there were very few
trials where subjects failed to respond [mean (SD), 2.47 (4.35) from
a total of 150 trials]. Thus, there was no indication that subjects
used this as an ‘escape route’ from aversive outcomes. Failure to
respond on one trial did not impact on movement time on
subsequent trials and mean movement time before, and after, this
contingency was utilised did not differ (ttest p.0.2).
Data Analysis
We initially focused on the overall effects of disease on
movement time, examining the differences in performance in the
money versus the shock trials, and comparing the effects of these
outcomes with those in the control group. We also examined
effects of previous trials’ outcomes on the movement times of
subsequent trials by performing multiple regression analysis. Here
we modelled separately the modulatory effects of receiving money
compared with not receiving money on the previous trial; and the
effects of receiving shock compared with not receiving a shock on
the previous trial. We also included terms for the overall average
effect on movement time of money and shock trials, anticipating
that these would be different. Beta values estimated from the
regression model were entered into one sample t-tests at the group




MT = movement time.
Money = indicator variable for all money reward trials. b1
corresponds to the average MT for money trials.
Shock = indicator variable for all shock punishment trials. b2
corresponds to the average MT for shock trials.
M(t21) = indicator (1/21) of outcome of previous money trial.
b3 corresponds to the modulatory effect of receiving money at trial
t21.
S (t21) = indicator (1/21) of outcome of previous shock trial. b4
corresponds to the modulatory effect of receiving a shock at trial
t21.
D(t) = indicator (1/21) of whether distractor present. b5
corresponds to the modulatory effect of a distractor at trial t.
e= error term.
Terms were entered simultaneously into the regression (i.e.
without orthogonalisation). Additionally, we performed an AN-
OVA examining the effect of the distractor on movement times,
testing for a 3-way interaction between block type (money/shock),
distractor (present/not present) and group (controls/patients).We
also looked at the time taken from the appearance of the money or
shock symbol until the first button press. This was to confirm there
were no differences in movement time between the groups or
valence conditions which could indicate differences in motor
preparation times. We excluded data from blocks where move-
ment times in the first block were over 150% longer than the
movement times in subsequent blocks for the same type of trial
(one money block in a control and one shock block in a patient).
We believe this incongruous performance in these subjects
reflected an initial failure to understand the task demands which
led to performance changing drastically between the first and
subsequent blocks.
Results
Our analysis indicated two main effects. First, we found an
effect of group whereby patients were slower overall than controls
F (1,21) = 15, p= 0.001 (Figure 2A). Second, we found an effect
of valence such that both patients and controls were faster for
shock compared to money trials (paired t-tests comparing money
with shock trials in controls T (1,10) = 2.51, p = 0.031 two tailed;
and in patients T(1,11) = 3.49, p = 0.005 two tailed) (Figure 2B).
Crucially we observed an interaction between group (control/
patients) and outcome valence condition (shock/money)
F(1,21) = 6.6, p= 0.017. The interaction was characterised by a
bigger difference in movement time (MT) between money trials and
shock trials in patients compared with controls (Figure 2C).
We next examined the effect of outcome in a previous trial on
movement time in the subsequent trial. We hypothesised that
movement times would be influenced both by context (i.e. money
compared with shock trials) and also experience on a previous
trial, evident in a trial-by-trial sensitivity to rewards and
punishments. For example, we expected that failure to achieve
the desired outcome (i.e. not winning money or receiving a shock)
on a previous trial would lead to faster movement on the
subsequent trial. This is what we found for the control group in the
case that they failed to win money (T(1,10) =22.23, p = 0.049 two
tailed). However, this speeding effect was absent in patients
(T(1,11) =21.23, p = 0.242 two tailed) indicating that controls
were not simply operating at ceiling speed in the money trials as
they modulated their movement times based on trial-by-trial
outcomes while PD patients did not. Both patients and controls
responded in the same manner to receipt of a shock by tending to
improve their speeds in the trials following shocks, however, this
speeding was not statistically significant.
In addition we found no differences in speed between the early
and late trials (t-test comparing average MT in first block
compared with last block; in patients for money trials
T(1,11) =20.643, p= 0.533, for shock trials T(1,11) =21.074,
p = 0.306; for controls for money trials T(1,10) = 0.251, p = 0.807,
for shock trials T(1,10) =20.960, p = 0.360) indicating that there
was no evidence of learning over the course of the blocks.
To ensure that the faster responding for shock in the patient
group could not be explained by a prolonged motor preparation
time, we examined the time taken from the symbol appearance to
the first button press There was no significant difference in this
initial period of time between the groups (patients/controls)
F(1,21) = 0 (p = 0.997) or conditions (shock/money)
F(1,21) = 0.557 (p= 0.464) or an interaction between group and
condition F(1,21) = 2.37 (p = 0.138) ruling out this possibility.
A differential effect of distractor on movement time was evident.
In the repeated measures ANOVA there was a significant 3 way
interaction between block (money/shock), distractor (present/not
present) and group (controls/patients) (F (1,21) = 7.54, p= 0.012)
characterised by patients’ movement time slowing when perform-
ing a shock trial where a distractor was present (Figure 3).
Our multiple regression analysis allowed us to look for more
subtle differences in the modulatory effect of previous trials on
movement time in the two groups while controlling for other
factors. This confirmed our findings that not winning money in a
previous trial had a significant effect on movement time in the
control group (one sample t-test p,0.001 two tailed. b3 (controls:
effect of loss at t21): mean (SE) 3.86 (0.7)), showing that controls sped
up significantly on a trial after they failed to win money. This
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speeding effect was absent in patients (one sample p= 0.458, two
tailed b3 (patients: effect of loss at t21): mean (SE) 2.15 (2.7)).
Discussion
Our most notable result is a valence asymmetry in the
movement time of PD patients. This comparative failure to speed
up in order to win rewards is consistent with previous findings in
PD patients OFF medication [11] and supports proposals that
tonic dopamine levels control the rate and vigour of movements,
possibly by signalling the average reward rate in the environment
[10,28]. This notion has been linked to the idea of impaired
‘motor motivation’ in PD, whereby there is a shift in the cost/
benefit ratio of moving fast [8]. Crucially, we find that although
the response to rewards appears impaired in the PD group when
compared with controls, the trial-by-trial response to punishments
is not similarly impacted, a fact which has not previously been
demonstrated. This finding highlights that in PD, dopamine
depletion has a lesser impact on responses to punishments
compared to rewards, and hints at a more complex role for
dopamine in active avoidance. A critical aspect to our task is that
we examined the effect of explicit contexts on movement time and
compared subjects in dopamine depleted and non-dopamine
depleted states. Our findings indicate that bradykinesia is not
simply related to movement, but rather to the way in which a
hypodopaminergic striatum computes action values.
Importantly, we observed a difference in the effect of past
monetary loss on subsequent actions in patients compared with
controls, where subjects were given trial-by-trial feedback on
whether their performance sufficed to merit a reward or avoid a
punishment. If learning is effective, we expect a speeding up of
movements following trials with negative outcomes (failure to win
money or avoid a shock), thereby improving the chances of
achieving the desired outcomes on subsequent trials. This effect
was evident in the control group for rewards, but was absent in the
PD patients. Patients did not speed up their movements after
failing to win a reward despite physically being able to move faster,
a fact they clearly demonstrated in the shock avoidance trials.
Parkinson’s disease results in deficits across several cognitive
domains, including probabilistic learning and classification tasks
[29,30] with dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) having distinct
effects on these behaviours. The observation of failure to adjust
Figure 2. (A) Average movement times. Average movement times (MT) (in ms) collapsed across money and shock trials for controls (white bars)
and patients (grey bars). Error bars represent (two times) the s.e.m. (B) Average movement times in money and shock trials. Average
movement times in money and shock trials for controls (white bars) and patients (grey bars). Error bars represent (two times) the s.e.m. (C) Money
MT minus shock MT. Differences in movement time in money compared with shock trials. Plotted is the difference in movement times (ms) in
money trials minus movement time in shock trials for controls (white bars) and patients (grey bars). Error bars represent (two times) the standard
error of the difference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047138.g002
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speed in the face of monetary loss in PD patients is consistent with
findings of impaired reward feedback learning in PD patients OFF
medication which has been shown in previous studies [31–33],
often postulated to be due to decreased reward prediction error
magnitude in response to positive outcomes. Of note, this trial-by-
trial adaptation, whereby subjects speed up in response to a failure
to win money has been observed previously albeit in the context of
a probabilistic task in which this speeding was evident in both
controls and patients [11]. One further possibility would have
been to compare trials with valenced outcomes with neutral trials,
however this risks lengthening the experiment and reducing power
and increasing fatigue, and behaviour towards neutral cues can be
difficult to interpret [34].
Finally, we found a detrimental effect of a distractor that was
only evident in the shock trials in PD patients, indicating that here
too there is an asymmetrical effect of valence. The context
specificity of distraction has been demonstrated previously, with
susceptibility to distraction being higher in PD patients when
multitasking is required [15–17] but lower in working memory
tasks when OFF medication [18,19]. Here we show that
distraction is also valence specific. PD patients can improve both
their motor speed and accuracy of their movements with increased
attention [35,36], and we propose that in our study, the
hypodopaminergic state in PD leads to decreased attending to
appetitive stimuli compared with aversive stimuli, leading to
improved motor performance at the cost of an increased sensitivity
to distraction in the aversive trials. This fits neatly with the known
reduced sensitivity of patients to rewards [32].
As this was not an imaging study we can only speculate on the
neural mechanism underlying the differences in behaviour
observed in the PD patients. Previous research has pointed to
compensatory increases and/or modulation of cortical activations
in PD patients carrying out motor tasks [37,38]. It is possible that
the trials with the negatively valenced outcomes influenced this
pattern of cortical engagement possibly by an interplay between
the motor and limbic fronto-striatal circuits [14] driving better
performance in these trials. In view of the fact that the effect of
distraction was significantly greater in the shock trials it may well
be that attentional factors play the biggest role in the modulation
of this cortical engagement. This would be interesting avenue to
pursue in the future with an imaging experiment.
In sum, we provide evidence that bradykinesia is in part a
context dependent deficit. We link the cognitive and motor deficits
associated with the PD hypodopaminergic state by demonstrating
that bradykinetic movements are dependent on the valence frame
in which movements are executed. Such modulation is apparent in
‘‘kinesia paradoxica’’, where PD patients can suddenly move quickly
in exceptional circumstances [13,14] eloquently described by Mac-
Donald Critchley in 1929 who noted: ‘‘The influence of the
emotions upon these more automatic movements is frequently
striking; under the influence of sudden fear or during an instinctive
response to danger, the gait may lose its feeble and short-stepping
characters and approximate to the normal.’’ By using monetary
gains and losses and comparing them with physical shocks we
aimed to recreate the aversive circumstances under which kinesia
paradoxica has been described [13]. Here we showed this effect in
a controlled environment with conventional cues whose motiva-
tional salience is internally rather than externally assessed. In the
future it would be interesting to see whether varying the
magnitude of both the positively and negatively valenced outcomes
might modulate this behavioural effect. Additionally we demon-
strated that distractors play an important role in performance in
PD patients and that this effect is also valence specific. A better
understanding of the impact of valence on movement may inform
the future development of new strategies to increase the
effectiveness of rehabilitation treatments.
Figure 3. Distractor MT minus no distractor MT. Plotted is the difference in movement time (ms) in trials with a distractor present minus
movement time in trials with no distractor present, for money trials and shock trials separately. Controls are represented by white bars and patients
by grey bars. Error bars represent (two times) the standard error of the difference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047138.g003
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